{
  "globals": {
    "world_oil_demand_mbd": 104,
    "iea_emergency_stocks_mb": 1200,
    "note": "Illustrative model. Hormuz uses IEA 2025 figures (Kpler ship-tracking); other chokepoints use 1H 2025 tanker-tracking flows (Vortexa data, published by EIA). Flows passing more than one chokepoint are counted at each, so combined totals are an upper bound.",
    "sources": [
      {
        "name": "EIA — World Oil Transit Chokepoints",
        "url": "https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints",
        "date": "2024"
      },
      {
        "name": "EIA — Today in Energy: Strait of Hormuz",
        "url": "https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=65504",
        "date": "2025-06-16"
      }
    ]
  },
  "chokepoints": {
    "strait-of-hormuz": {
      "portwatch": "Strait of Hormuz",
      "oil_mbd": 19.9,
      "lng_share_pct": 20,
      "reroute": "none",
      "reroute_days": 0,
      "bypass": [
        {
          "asset": "east-west-pipeline",
          "outlet": "yanbu-terminal",
          "spare_mbd": 3.0,
          "note": "Saudi Abqaiq→Yanbu, 7 mb/d since the 2026 NGL-to-crude conversion (Aramco; 5 mb/d in 2018). ~2 mb/d was in use in early 2026, leaving 3–5 mb/d spare depending on Red Sea export capacity (IEA). Low end counted."
        },
        {
          "asset": "habshan-fujairah-pipeline",
          "outlet": "fujairah",
          "spare_mbd": 0.5,
          "note": "UAE Habshan→Fujairah (ADCOP), ~1.8 mb/d; ~1.1 mb/d already used, leaving up to 0.7 mb/d (IEA). Low end counted."
        },
        {
          "asset": "kirkuk-ceyhan-pipeline",
          "spare_mbd": null,
          "note": "Iraq→Turkey, ~1.6 mb/d nameplate. Restarted 18 Mar 2026 at ~250 kb/d; usable volume depends on Baghdad–Erbil–Ankara politics. Not counted."
        }
      ],
      "bypass_note": "IEA estimates 3.5–5.5 mb/d of Saudi and UAE pipeline capacity could bypass Hormuz; the model counts the low end. Iran's Goreh–Jask line is effectively non-operational. Iraq's Basra, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain exports and all Qatari/UAE LNG (just over 112 bcm, almost 20% of global LNG trade) have no bypass. Most of the world's spare crude capacity (>4 mb/d, mainly Saudi) also sits behind the strait.",
      "stranded": [
        "kharg-island",
        "ras-tanura-terminal",
        "mina-al-ahmadi",
        "ras-laffan-lng",
        "ras-tanura-refinery",
        "ruwais-refinery",
        "jubail-industrial-complex",
        "jebel-ali-dubai",
        "burgan-oil",
        "rumaila-oil",
        "west-qurna-1-2-oil",
        "majnoon-oil",
        "zakum-oil",
        "safaniyah-oil",
        "khafji-oil",
        "north-field-south-pars-gas",
        "dome-gas",
        "ahvaz-oil",
        "marun-oil",
        "aghajari-oil",
        "basra-oil-terminal",
        "ras-al-juaymah-terminal",
        "mina-abdullah-refinery",
        "mesaieed-industrial-city"
      ],
      "exposed": [
        {
          "country": "China",
          "note": "4.6 mb/d of Hormuz crude in 2025, the largest single destination (IEA/Kpler)."
        },
        {
          "country": "India",
          "note": "2.1 mb/d of Hormuz crude; with Bangladesh and Pakistan, received almost two-thirds of its LNG via Hormuz."
        },
        {
          "country": "Japan & South Korea",
          "note": "Part of 6.2 mb/d of crude to 'other Asia'; IEA calls both particularly reliant on Hormuz flows."
        },
        {
          "country": "Bangladesh & Pakistan",
          "note": "Gas is 50% and 25% of their power mix; LNG shortfalls hit electricity supply directly."
        },
        {
          "country": "Europe",
          "note": "Only ~0.6 mb/d of crude and ~7% of its LNG came via Hormuz, but exposed through global prices."
        }
      ],
      "sources": [
        {
          "name": "IEA — Strait of Hormuz Factsheet (Feb 2026, based on Kpler)",
          "url": "https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/c8248eba-8689-46d9-ae4b-b858b59c0f1c/StraitofHormuz2026-Factsheet.pdf",
          "date": "2026-02"
        }
      ]
    },
    "bab-el-mandeb": {
      "portwatch": "Bab el-Mandeb Strait",
      "oil_mbd": 4.2,
      "lng_share_pct": 0,
      "reroute": "cape",
      "reroute_days": 12,
      "bypass": [],
      "bypass_note": "1H 2025 flows (EIA), already reduced by Houthi attacks; ~8.7 mb/d moved through before them (1H 2023). No pipeline bypass: traffic reroutes around the Cape of Good Hope. Yanbu cargoes heading north to Europe can still reach Suez/SUMED without crossing the strait.",
      "stranded": [
        "yanbu-terminal",
        "djibouti",
        "samref-refinery",
        "jazan-refinery"
      ],
      "exposed": [
        {
          "country": "Europe",
          "note": "Middle East crude, diesel and jet fuel via Suez; longer voyages raise delivered costs."
        },
        {
          "country": "Egypt",
          "note": "Suez Canal and SUMED revenues collapse when traffic diverts."
        },
        {
          "country": "Saudi Arabia",
          "note": "Yanbu exports (the Hormuz bypass outlet) sit inside the Red Sea."
        }
      ],
      "sources": [
        {
          "name": "EIA — World Oil Transit Chokepoints (1H 2025 flows)",
          "url": "https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/",
          "date": "2026-03-03"
        },
        {
          "name": "EIA — Red Sea chokepoints",
          "url": "https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61025",
          "date": "2023-12-04"
        },
        {
          "name": "EIA — Red Sea disruptions increase oil flows around Cape of Good Hope",
          "url": "https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=62263",
          "date": "2024"
        }
      ]
    },
    "suez-canal": {
      "portwatch": "Suez Canal",
      "oil_mbd": 4.9,
      "lng_share_pct": 8,
      "reroute": "cape",
      "reroute_days": 12,
      "bypass": [
        {
          "asset": "sumed-pipeline",
          "spare_mbd": 1.0,
          "note": "Ain Sukhna→Sidi Kerir, ~2.5 mb/d capacity. Only helps if tankers can still reach the Red Sea side.",
          "outlet": "sidi-kerir-terminal"
        }
      ],
      "bypass_note": "Baseline is Suez Canal + SUMED combined flow, 1H 2023. Baseline: EIA 1H 2025 flows.",
      "stranded": [
        "sidi-kerir-terminal"
      ],
      "exposed": [
        {
          "country": "Europe",
          "note": "Main route for Gulf and Asian oil products and LNG into the Mediterranean and NW Europe."
        },
        {
          "country": "Egypt",
          "note": "Canal fees are one of the state's largest sources of foreign currency."
        }
      ],
      "sources": [
        {
          "name": "EIA — World Oil Transit Chokepoints (1H 2025 flows)",
          "url": "https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/",
          "date": "2026-03-03"
        },
        {
          "name": "EIA — Red Sea chokepoints",
          "url": "https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61025",
          "date": "2023-12-04"
        }
      ]
    },
    "turkish-straits": {
      "portwatch": "Bosporus Strait",
      "oil_mbd": 3.7,
      "lng_share_pct": 0,
      "reroute": "none",
      "reroute_days": 0,
      "bypass": [],
      "bypass_note": "The Black Sea has no other exit. BTC (Azerbaijan→Ceyhan) is unaffected because it loads on the Mediterranean. Baseline: EIA 1H 2025 flows.",
      "stranded": [
        "novorossiysk",
        "cpc-pipeline",
        "tengiz-oil",
        "kashagan-oil"
      ],
      "exposed": [
        {
          "country": "Kazakhstan",
          "note": "CPC carries ~80% of Kazakh crude exports to Novorossiysk."
        },
        {
          "country": "Russia",
          "note": "Black Sea crude and product exports."
        },
        {
          "country": "Mediterranean refiners",
          "note": "Italy, Greece, Spain and Turkey rely on CPC Blend and Black Sea barrels."
        }
      ],
      "sources": [
        {
          "name": "EIA — World Oil Transit Chokepoints (1H 2025 flows)",
          "url": "https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/",
          "date": "2026-03-03"
        },
        {
          "name": "EIA — World Oil Transit Chokepoints",
          "url": "https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints",
          "date": "2024"
        }
      ]
    },
    "strait-of-malacca": {
      "portwatch": "Malacca Strait",
      "oil_mbd": 23.2,
      "lng_share_pct": 25,
      "reroute": "lombok",
      "reroute_days": 3,
      "bypass": [],
      "bypass_note": "Ships can divert via the Lombok/Makassar or Sunda straits at the cost of ~2–3 extra days. China's overland pipelines (Central Asia, Russia, Myanmar) cover only a small share of its imports. Baseline: EIA 1H 2025 flows.",
      "stranded": [
        "singapore",
        "jurong-island-refining-complex"
      ],
      "exposed": [
        {
          "country": "China",
          "note": "~80% of oil imports (\"Malacca Dilemma\")."
        },
        {
          "country": "Japan",
          "note": "Nearly all Gulf crude and LNG passes Malacca or nearby straits."
        },
        {
          "country": "South Korea",
          "note": "Same exposure as Japan."
        },
        {
          "country": "Taiwan",
          "note": "Almost entirely dependent on seaborne energy imports."
        }
      ],
      "sources": [
        {
          "name": "EIA — World Oil Transit Chokepoints (1H 2025 flows)",
          "url": "https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/",
          "date": "2026-03-03"
        },
        {
          "name": "EIA — World Oil Transit Chokepoints",
          "url": "https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints",
          "date": "2024"
        }
      ]
    },
    "panama-canal": {
      "portwatch": "Panama Canal",
      "oil_mbd": 2.3,
      "lng_share_pct": 4,
      "reroute": "cape",
      "reroute_days": 14,
      "bypass": [],
      "bypass_note": "US Gulf LNG to Asia diverts via the Cape of Good Hope or Cape Horn, adding ~2 weeks. That ties up LNG carrier capacity and raises Asian spot prices. Oil figure is approximate. Baseline: EIA 1H 2025 flows.",
      "stranded": [],
      "exposed": [
        {
          "country": "Japan / Korea / China",
          "note": "US LNG and LPG cargoes to Northeast Asia."
        },
        {
          "country": "US LNG exporters",
          "note": "Longer voyages make Asian sales less competitive; more cargoes default to Europe."
        },
        {
          "country": "West coast of South America",
          "note": "Refined product imports from the US Gulf Coast."
        }
      ],
      "sources": [
        {
          "name": "EIA — World Oil Transit Chokepoints (1H 2025 flows)",
          "url": "https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/",
          "date": "2026-03-03"
        },
        {
          "name": "EIA — Drought at the Panama Canal delays energy shipments",
          "url": "https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=60842",
          "date": "2023"
        },
        {
          "name": "EIA — Panama Canal traffic to increase as drought conditions ease",
          "url": "https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=62408",
          "date": "2024"
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}