Chokepoint Disrupted
Is the Bab el-Mandeb open?
Only partly. As of September 25, 2026, shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb is disrupted (since July 20, 2026). IMF PortWatch satellite tracking recorded an average of 6.6 tankers a day in the week to September 20, 2026, 46% below the Sep 2025–Feb 2026 average of 12.1. Some ships sail with transponders off, so tracked counts may understate traffic.
Updated September 25, 2026 · View on the live map →
The Houthis have enforced a 'ban' on Saudi-linked shipping since 20 July, hitting ships (Tihamah 12 Aug, Bahri VLCC off Yanbu 24 Aug) and seizing Mocha and Red Sea islands on 10-11 Sep. Tanker transits fell sharply; overall transits were ~15% below pre-ban levels by late August.
| Tankers per day, last 7 days | 6.6 |
|---|---|
| Sep 2025–Feb 2026 average | 12.1 |
| Change | −46% |
| All vessels per day, last 7 days | 25 |
7-day average of daily tanker transits from IMF PortWatch (satellite AIS data, about a week's lag), through September 20, 2026.
| Oil flow before the crisis | 4.2 million barrels a day |
|---|---|
| Sea route around it | Cape of Good Hope, +12 days |
1H 2025 flows (EIA), already reduced by Houthi attacks; ~8.7 mb/d moved through before them (1H 2023). No pipeline bypass: traffic reroutes around the Cape of Good Hope. Yanbu cargoes heading north to Europe can still reach Suez/SUMED without crossing the strait.
Ships could divert, adding about 12 days per voyage for ~4.2 mb/d of oil. That ties up tankers and raises freight and insurance costs, but supply is delayed rather than lost.
Facilities cut off: Yanbu Terminal, Djibouti, SAMREF refinery (Yanbu), Aramco Jazan refinery.
Illustrative model using pre-crisis baselines; see how the what-if model works. Try combinations in the live map's What-if tab.
Houthi forces captured the port city of Mocha on 10 September, according to Yemeni government military sources cited by Reuters, and subsequently several Red Sea islands; government forces fell back to Dhubab opposite Perim Island. The advance gives the group more leverage over the Bab el-Mandeb strait as it enforces a declared blockade on Saudi-linked shipping.
A Bahri-owned VLCC was hit by a ballistic missile about 63 nm west of Yanbu, starting a fire; crew were unharmed. The Houthis said it enforced their ban on Saudi shipping. Lloyd's List Intelligence reported no further Red Sea attacks through early September, with the threat focused on Saudi-linked tonnage.
The Houthis hit the Egyptian-owned cargo ship Tihamah in Bab el-Mandeb with three ballistic missiles and a follow-up strike, killing at least six, the first shipping deaths linked to the group since the war began. The Houthis had declared a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia after Saudi airstrikes ended the 2022 truce on 13 July.
The Houthis declared all vessels loading or discharging at Saudi ports prohibited from 20 July. Bab el-Mandeb transits fell 24% to 269 in the week of 20 July (354 the week before) and mainstream tanker transits fell 42% to 53, before stabilising. Saudi tankers turned back and the group later claimed attacks on Yanbu installations.
Connects Red Sea to Gulf of Aden. ~29 km wide. ~6-7 million bpd of oil. Gateway to/from Suez Canal from the south. Houthi attacks since late 2023 have forced major rerouting around Cape of Good Hope.
The Houthi campaign against Red Sea shipping (beginning Nov 2023, citing solidarity with Gaza) has demonstrated how a non-state actor with relatively low-cost anti-ship missiles and drones can disrupt a critical global trade artery. The US-UK Operation Prosperity Guardian has conducted strikes against Houthi positions but has not stopped attacks. Major container lines (Maersk, MSC, Hapag-Lloyd) rerouted around Africa. Insurance premiums for Red Sea transit spiked 10x. Djibouti, on the strait's western shore, hosts military bases from the US, China, France, Japan, and Italy — making it the most concentrated point of great-power military presence globally. The strait's vulnerability has accelerated interest in rail and pipeline alternatives.
Only partly. As of September 25, 2026, shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb is disrupted (since July 20, 2026). IMF PortWatch satellite tracking recorded an average of 6.6 tankers a day in the week to September 20, 2026, 46% below the Sep 2025–Feb 2026 average of 12.1. Some ships sail with transponders off, so tracked counts may understate traffic.
About 4.2 million barrels a day of crude and oil products before the 2026 crisis. Baseline: EIA — World Oil Transit Chokepoints (1H 2025 flows).
Ships can sail around it (via the Cape of Good Hope), adding about 12 days per voyage, so flows are delayed rather than lost.
Europe: Middle East crude, diesel and jet fuel via Suez; longer voyages raise delivered costs. Egypt: Suez Canal and SUMED revenues collapse when traffic diverts. Saudi Arabia: Yanbu exports (the Hormuz bypass outlet) sit inside the Red Sea.
Other chokepoints: Strait of Hormuz · Turkish Straits (Bosphorus & Dardanelles) · Suez Canal · Strait of Malacca · Eastern Mediterranean Energy Zone · Panama Canal · Cape of Good Hope