Chokepoint Closed
Is the Strait of Hormuz open?
No. As of September 27, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz is effectively closed to normal commercial traffic (since February 28, 2026). IMF PortWatch satellite tracking recorded an average of 0.6 tankers a day in the week to September 20, 2026, 99% below the Sep 2025–Feb 2026 average of 40.4. Some ships sail with transponders off, so tracked counts may understate traffic.
Updated September 27, 2026 · View on the live map →
Effectively closed to normal commercial traffic since 28 Feb: Iran requires permits and fees through its Strait Authority, a US blockade of Iranian ports has been in force since 14 July, and attacks on ships continue. Independent Kpler data showed 33.7 mb of crude leaving the strait in the week from 20 Sep, against ~105 mb a week before the war. Many tankers sail with transponders off, so independent counts are partial.
| Tankers per day, last 7 days | 0.6 |
|---|---|
| Sep 2025–Feb 2026 average | 40.4 |
| Change | −99% |
| All vessels per day, last 7 days | 3 |
7-day average of daily tanker transits from IMF PortWatch (satellite AIS data, about a week's lag), through September 20, 2026.
| Oil flow before the crisis | 19.9 million barrels a day |
|---|---|
| Share of global LNG trade | ~20% |
| Sea route around it | None |
| Bypass: East-West Pipeline (Petroline) | ~3 mb/d spare |
| Bypass: Habshan–Fujairah Pipeline | ~0.5 mb/d spare |
| Bypass: Kirkuk–Ceyhan Pipeline | not counted |
IEA estimates 3.5–5.5 mb/d of Saudi and UAE pipeline capacity could bypass Hormuz; the model counts the low end. Iran's Goreh–Jask line is effectively non-operational. Iraq's Basra, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain exports and all Qatari/UAE LNG (just over 112 bcm, almost 20% of global LNG trade) have no bypass. Most of the world's spare crude capacity (>4 mb/d, mainly Saudi) also sits behind the strait.
Closing it would cut about 19.9 mb/d of oil with no sea route around it. Usable pipeline bypass capacity of ~3.5 mb/d leaves a net shortfall of about 16.4 mb/d, roughly 15.8% of world oil demand.
Facilities cut off: Kharg Island, Ras Tanura Terminal, Mina al-Ahmadi, Ras Laffan LNG, Ras Tanura Refinery, Ruwais Refinery, Jubail Industrial Complex, Jebel Ali / Dubai, Burgan, Rumaila, West Qurna 1 & 2, Majnoon, Zakum (Upper & Lower), Safaniyah, Khafji (Partitioned Neutral Zone), North Field / South Pars, Dome (North Dome Extension), Ahvaz, Marun, Aghajari, Basra Oil Terminal (Al Basrah / Khor al-Amaya), Ras al-Ju'aymah crude/LPG terminal, Mina Abdullah refinery (Kuwait), Mesaieed Industrial City (Qatar).
Illustrative model using pre-crisis baselines; see how the what-if model works. Try combinations in the live map's What-if tab.
Explosions were reported near Qeshm Island on 27 September, with anti-ship missiles and drones allegedly fired at transiting vessels, hours after President Trump rejected Iran's proposal to reopen the strait. Iran's Persian Gulf Strait Authority has instructed shippers to use an Iranian-approved temporary route and pay fees, threatening to blacklist charterers using other routes.
At the UN General Assembly Iran offered to reopen the Strait of Hormuz within a week if seven conditions were met, including lifting the US blockade, releasing frozen funds and ending attacks on all fronts; Trump rejected it on 26 September. Reuters had reported US and Iranian negotiators in New York exploring a phased deal (strait reopening in exchange for lifting the blockade), which briefly pushed oil prices lower.
Preliminary Kpler data showed 33.7 million barrels of crude leaving the Strait of Hormuz in the week starting 20 September, against roughly 105 million barrels a week before the war (about 15 mb/d of crude in 2025, per IEA analysis of Kpler data). Many tankers now transit with transponders off, so ship-tracking figures are likely to understate actual flows.
An Indian cargo ship was attacked in the Strait of Hormuz, killing a sailor, as attacks on shipping continued despite US assertions that the waterway is open.
Six to seven VLCCs loaded roughly 12–14 million barrels at Ras Tanura and Ju'aymah on 21 September, the busiest day since before the war (MarineTraffic, TankerTrackers.com). Provisional Kpler data showed Saudi crude exports recovering to more than 4 mb/d so far in September, from about 2.4 mb/d in August, the lowest since at least 2013. Much Gulf-side loading moves on AIS-dark tankers, so tracked figures may be incomplete.
Bloomberg ship-tracking showed at least four Qatari LNG carriers moving through Hormuz in a week (two laden outbound), the most sustained activity since Qatar largely halted exports via the strait in early July after one of its tankers was attacked. Energy Minister al-Kaabi said on 21 September undamaged parts of Ras Laffan could restart within a couple of weeks of the strait reopening; about 17% of capacity (two trains) remains destroyed.
US forces struck three Iranian vessels on 5 September, including a tanker off Kharg Island and another near Jask, after Iran fired ballistic missiles at a US aircraft carrier and destroyer (no US injuries). Iran said it targeted tankers using an 'unauthorised route'. Vessel counts averaged ~13/day over the prior 10 days versus ~100 pre-war.
After projectiles hit tankers including the VLCC Senegal Prosperity on 30–31 August, US forces struck Iranian radars, air defences, maritime and mine-laying sites on 30 August–1 September (per CENTCOM, reported by CTP-ISW); Iran retaliated against US and allied bases.
A Joint Maritime Information Center advisory on 25 August kept the mine threat in the Strait of Hormuz at SEVERE, warning of drifting or uncharted mines. The same day President Trump claimed all mines in international waters had been cleared; that claim has not been independently verified.
The UAE suspended all trade, commercial exchanges and financial transactions with Iran after two Iranian ballistic missiles fell into the sea on 18 August, one in Emirati waters.
The US naval blockade of Iranian ports was reimposed on 14 July after the June truce collapsed. Independent data on how far it has cut Iranian exports is limited; US figures on vessels redirected are not used here.
Following attacks on commercial ships, the US struck Iranian territory and Iran retaliated against US Gulf bases; Trump declared the truce over. The US revoked a 60-day waiver on Iranian oil sales, effective 17 July. Brent rose over 3% from near pre-war levels; one analyst said transits had stayed below 50% of pre-war levels for months.
Connects Persian Gulf to Gulf of Oman. ~21 km at narrowest. ~21 million bpd of oil transits daily (~20% of global supply). Most critical energy chokepoint in the world. Bordered by Iran and Oman.
Iran's primary source of strategic leverage. Tehran has repeatedly threatened to close the strait during confrontations with the US (1988 tanker war, 2012 nuclear sanctions, 2019-2020 tensions). The US Fifth Fleet (based in Bahrain) maintains a permanent carrier presence specifically to guarantee freedom of navigation. In 2019, Iran seized tankers and attacked others with limpet mines, demonstrating capability without full closure. Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Iraq have invested billions in bypass pipelines (Petroline, Habshan-Fujairah) as insurance. A full closure would trigger a global energy crisis — oil prices could spike to $200+/bbl. The strait's narrow shipping lanes technically pass through Omani and Iranian territorial waters, making the legal framework complex.
No. As of September 27, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz is effectively closed to normal commercial traffic (since February 28, 2026). IMF PortWatch satellite tracking recorded an average of 0.6 tankers a day in the week to September 20, 2026, 99% below the Sep 2025–Feb 2026 average of 40.4. Some ships sail with transponders off, so tracked counts may understate traffic.
About 19.9 million barrels a day of crude and oil products before the 2026 crisis, plus around 20% of global LNG trade. Baseline: IEA — Strait of Hormuz Factsheet (Feb 2026, based on Kpler).
There is no sea route around it. Pipelines can bypass about 3.5 mb/d (East-West Pipeline (Petroline), Habshan–Fujairah Pipeline), leaving roughly 16.4 mb/d with no alternative route.
China: 4.6 mb/d of Hormuz crude in 2025, the largest single destination (IEA/Kpler). India: 2.1 mb/d of Hormuz crude; with Bangladesh and Pakistan, received almost two-thirds of its LNG via Hormuz. Japan & South Korea: Part of 6.2 mb/d of crude to 'other Asia'; IEA calls both particularly reliant on Hormuz flows. Bangladesh & Pakistan: Gas is 50% and 25% of their power mix; LNG shortfalls hit electricity supply directly. Europe: Only ~0.6 mb/d of crude and ~7% of its LNG came via Hormuz, but exposed through global prices.
Other chokepoints: Turkish Straits (Bosphorus & Dardanelles) · Suez Canal · Bab el-Mandeb · Strait of Malacca · Eastern Mediterranean Energy Zone · Panama Canal · Cape of Good Hope