Strait of Hormuz: status, ship traffic and energy flows

Current situation

Effectively closed to normal commercial traffic since 28 Feb: Iran requires permits and fees through its Strait Authority, a US blockade of Iranian ports has been in force since 14 July, and attacks on ships continue. The IMO recorded 9 tanker attacks in the strait in the week of 28 Sep-5 Oct, the highest weekly total since the war began; a chemical tanker (Acers) was separately struck by projectiles on 7 Oct about 51 nautical miles off Qatar, west of the usual attack cluster, and Iran's IRGC said it struck the LPG tanker NV Sunshine on 9 Oct for taking an unauthorized route (IRGC claim, unverified). Reuters reported, citing officials close to Tehran, that Iran plans to widen threats against ships using routes it hasn't authorized, including Omani-side channels and Gulf of Oman transfer points — a plan that could not be independently verified. President Trump said on 8 Oct the US will not attack Iran before November's midterm elections, that the US blockade remains in force, and that oil is flowing through the strait; he rejected Iran's latest proposal to end the war. Saudi Aramco is in talks to formalize long-term shuttle contracts built on the ship-to-ship transfer system that bypasses the strait, and VLCC freight on the Gulf-to-Asia route hit a record near $1.4 million/day as that shuttle system strains vessel supply. Kpler ship-tracking data put Hormuz crude exports at about 8.5 mb/d (roughly 40% below pre-war) in the week to 7 Oct, down from the 13.2 mb/d (about 77% of baseline) Kpler reported for the week to 29 Sep, even as satellite imagery had shown a 'major operational recovery' at Saudi Arabia's Yanbu terminal; Vortexa separately put non-Iranian Gulf oil flows at 81% of pre-war levels in September. Tankers still move mainly under naval escort or shuttle arrangements rather than normal free transit, and many sail with transponders off, so independent counts remain partial; IMF PortWatch's AIS-tracked tanker count for Hormuz averaged just 0.6/day in the week to 11 Oct, down from 1.3/day in late September, though broader tracking shows higher flows since many vessels sail dark. The attack zone widened further on 9 October when the fully laden VLCC GEM NO.2 was struck by an unidentified projectile about 13 nautical miles west of Al Jazeera, UAE, outside the strait itself; two more unnamed outbound tankers were then hit by projectiles and caught fire inside the strait on 10 and 11 October, per UKMTO, with crews reported safe in both cases. Iran's security chief Mohsen Rezaei said on 11 October that the US response to Iran's seven conditions for reopening the strait was ‘insufficient’ and that Tehran would stop responding through the current channel; the US had replied via Qatari intermediaries. Delayed UKMTO and JMIC reports disclosed on 12 Oct showed the 11 Oct toll was larger than first known: six vessels, five tankers and a container ship, were struck that day, the highest single-day total since the war began; one was hit by a drone at Oman's Sohar anchorage and reclassified from 'suspicious activity' to an attack, and JMIC raised its threat assessment for the strait to SEVERE. No group claimed responsibility for any of the six. On 13 October the Singapore-flagged container ship GFS Pride sank after a projectile strike (21 crew safe; Iran's unevidenced naval-mine claim was disputed by maritime security firm Marisks), its sister ship GFS Giselle was damaged but reached anchorage, and the bulk carrier Cape Dao — struck 23 September — also went down; the IMO has documented more than 100 confirmed incidents and at least 24 seafarer deaths in the strait since the war began. CENTCOM said on 14 October it had destroyed an Iranian-affiliated dhow in the Gulf of Oman on 6 October, alleging it was helping target US Navy ships (CENTCOM claim, unverified). On 15 October CENTCOM said the US and regional partners "control the strait as commercial vessels continue to transit," citing more than 40 commercial transits in the prior 24 hours (CENTCOM claim, unverified); the JMIC advisory for 11-14 October counted about 121 US-facilitated transits, roughly 30 a day and about 22% of the ~138/day pre-war average, and said US forces had redirected 135 commercial vessels and disabled four as of 10-11 October. The IMO put the cumulative toll at 113 confirmed incidents and at least 24 seafarer deaths in the strait since the war began as of 14 October; JMIC separately logged 149 confirmed vessel incidents region-wide since 1 March, including eight projectile attacks on four tankers and four containerships on 11 and 13 October and a separate strike near Sohar, Oman, that left two crew of the tanker Petro Dolphin missing. UKMTO's weekly overview (16 Oct) said most vessels struck in the region are not reporting incidents to it, logged 12 further attacks in its latest period (10 in the strait, one each in the Arabian Gulf and Gulf of Oman), and counted only 254 transits in the week to 14 October (70% below pre-war levels) — of which just 42 were directly AIS-tracked, the rest being unverifiable US-reported 'facilitated' transits. CENTCOM commander Adm. Brad Cooper said on 16 October that about 400 merchant ships transited in the same week and that US forces helped move over 100 million barrels of crude (CENTCOM claim, unverified), a figure UKMTO's own count cannot confirm; Iran's army chief Maj. Gen. Amir Hatami said on 15 October the strait would stay closed until Iran's rights are respected (Iranian claim, unverified). Reuters separately reported, citing tracking group UANI and satellite analysis firm SynMax, that Iran has shipped at least 4.1 million barrels of LPG on eight tankers and one jet-fuel cargo (to Myanmar in September) past the US blockade since mid-July, even as Iran's own crude exports fell to zero in September for the first time since Kpler began tracking the country in 2013. Gulf-to-China VLCC freight rates eased about 8% week on week to 776 Worldscale by 16 October, still near record highs, as Middle East demand cooled and Washington weighed easing shadow-fleet tanker sanctions. UKMTO reported that two tankers were struck 68 and 78 nautical miles northeast of al-Jubail, Saudi Arabia on 16 October, outside the strait itself, which ISW/CTP assessed was likely the work of the IRGC Navy; Iran's Revolutionary Guards separately said the ships, each carrying about 2 million barrels of crude, hit naval mines on an unauthorized route (IRGC claim, unverified; no independent confirmation per Reuters). Vitol's Asia head said on 16 October that a shortage of high-sulfur fuel oil for ships will persist even as Hormuz crude flows rise, as Gulf fuel-oil exports fall and refiners favor higher-margin diesel. Iran's Revolutionary Guards said on 17 October that two more tankers, each carrying about 2 million barrels of crude, caught fire after hitting naval mines in the strait with their tracking switched off (IRGC claim, unverified; Reuters found no independent confirmation). On 18 October Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Iran's offer to reopen the strait within seven days of a US acceptance, first made in mid-September, still stands; the US has replied via Qatari mediators, but the two sides remain stuck on Washington's demand that Iran also address its nuclear program. Separately on 18 October, Turkey's energy minister said Ankara will take some of the diesel Russia is supplying under the Trump-Putin deal, after Russia curtailed exports. A tugboat was damaged by two unknown projectiles northeast of Khor Fakkan, UAE on 18 October, injuring one crew member before it continued its route; ISW/CTP assessed Iran likely carried out the strike. On 19 October Bloomberg reported Iran's oil-loading terminals have sat idle since late August, the longest stretch of the war, and that UKMTO logged 25 ships targeted in and around the strait in the first two weeks of October, versus 18 in September and 15 in August; separately, Energy Secretary Chris Wright said the US will let investors buy and refurbish sanctioned tankers to carry non-sanctioned crude, as Gulf-to-Asia freight rates remain more than six times pre-war levels. On 19 October Yemen's Houthis claimed missile-and-drone strikes on Aramco's Yanbu site, the Shaybah oil field, and airports in Riyadh and Abha; Reuters reported no independent or Saudi confirmation (Houthi claim, unverified). Preliminary Kpler ship-tracking data put combined Middle East oil flows — Hormuz transits plus Gulf of Oman ship-to-ship transfers, Fujairah/Omani terminal loadings and Red Sea exports — at more than 24.5 million bpd in the week to 18 October, edging above the 24.4 million bpd Kpler recorded the week before the war began; Iran's own exports remain excluded and at zero. The IMO's cumulative toll rose to 116 confirmed incidents and at least 24 seafarer deaths in the strait as of 20 October, up from 113 incidents on 14 October. Brent rose to a five-month high near $111/bbl on 20 October amid the renewed Houthi claims. UKMTO's tally for the wider Arabian Peninsula region reached 32 attacks on commercial vessels so far in October as of 21 October, already double September's total of 16, even as most tankers in the area now sail with AIS tracking off; the figure differs from UKMTO's own 25-attack count for the strait area reported on 19 October, a gap likely reflecting different reporting windows rather than a correction. South Korean shipowner Sinokor moved 105.6 million barrels of crude through the strait in September — almost 40% of the month's total and more than the next three owners (Bahri, Kuwait Oil Tanker Company and ADNOC's shipping arm) combined — running short shuttle trips from Gulf terminals to ship-to-ship transfer points in the Gulf of Oman, per ship-tracking data compiled by Bloomberg (Vortexa, Equasis, Signal Group). The IEA put Gulf-to-Asia tanker freight above $37 a barrel on 21 October, more than five times pre-war levels. Iran's Revolutionary Guards said on 22 October that seven commercial vessels, four of them mid ship-to-ship transfer, were struck overnight in the Gulf and the strait; President Trump dismissed the claim on Truth Social as Iran 'making up fake hits, mines, and everything else' to raise oil prices before the 3 November midterms. UKMTO had issued no incident reports matching either account as of this writing, so neither the attack nor the denial is independently established (IRGC claim and Trump statement, both unverified). The New York Times reported, citing US officials, that the US and Israeli militaries are planning a short, intensive operation against Iran for after the midterms; Brent rose to $116.72 on 23 October, its highest close since 29 April, on the reports. JMIC's count for 22-24 October found just 101 transits, about a quarter of the ~138/day pre-war baseline, with about 492 vessels waiting outside the strait as of 25 October, and said the backlog is likely to persist; UKMTO separately logged 18,049 anomalous AIS positions in the Gulf in its 23 October weekly overview. UKMTO said a small boat attached two explosive devices to a tanker's hull about 25 nautical miles northeast of Oman's Khasab on 29 October; the resulting engine-room fire was extinguished, the crew were safe, and the vessel continued to its next port of call, with no group claiming responsibility. Iran's Revolutionary Guards and army separately claimed, on the same day, that three tankers and then a fourth struck mines in and east of the strait (IRGC and army claims, unverified; no independent confirmation). The International Maritime Organization recorded at least 30 vessels hit in the Hormuz region in October through 27 October, injuring at least 16 seafarers — double September's 15 confirmed incidents and the worst month of the war, per CNBC's report of IMO data. Oman's Maritime Security Centre said its navy evacuated 25 crew members from the Panama-flagged tanker RITI after it was attacked and caught fire off Oman's coast on 30 October, with no casualties; UKMTO separately reported a tanker struck by an unknown projectile and set on fire about 40 nautical miles south of Iran's Lavan Island the same day, crew safe (both confirmed, via AFP). Iran's Revolutionary Guards said on 30 October that three more tankers had "encountered incidents" on routes it considers unauthorized and were halted in the strait's southern waters, including a supertanker carrying about 2 million barrels that stopped after a mine explosion (IRGC claim, unverified; reporting on the tanker count was internally inconsistent and it is unclear whether these overlap with the 29 October claims). US Central Command's Adm. Brad Cooper said on 30 October that the strait's main shipping lanes had been cleared of Iranian mines and that Iran's navy had been destroyed; CENTCOM separately rejected an IRGC claim that Iran seized a US surveillance drone (CENTCOM claims, unverified). Kpler ship-tracking data put average Hormuz crude exports at about 11.1 mb/d for October through late in the month, about 2% below September, falling to 7.3 mb/d in the week to 28 October, more than 40% below the pre-war baseline, per CNBC. Qatari mediators returned to Tehran on 30 October for a fresh round of talks; CBS reported signs of progress and said Iran was expected to respond to a revised Qatari proposal by the end of the week, while Axios said the sides remain divided over nuclear-site inspections and sanctions relief, and the Wall Street Journal reported Vice President Vance had separately written to Iranian security chief Mohsen Rezaei on 28 October to try to restart talks. Axios and AP, citing diplomats, reported the US has also warned Gulf allies to prepare for a short, intense military campaign after the 3 November midterms, corroborating earlier NYT reporting; officials said no final decision had been made. UKMTO reported a separate vessel struck by an unknown projectile in the strait on 1 November, relayed via a mayday call from a nearby merchant vessel; no casualties or claim of responsibility have been reported. Axios reported, citing sources, that Trump told Netanyahu by phone he wants to give Iran diplomacy more time before considering further strikes, after Secretary of State Rubio said on 31 October that no decision had been made on new strikes; Trump told reporters the US would end the war “one way or the other.” Brent and WTI each fell more than 3% on 2 November on the remarks, two days before the 3 November US midterm elections. A US official confirmed to Reuters on 3 November that US forces struck Iran's Qeshm Island, the strait's largest island, in what officials called a defensive response to Iran firing surface-to-air missiles at US assets; the Wall Street Journal reported the US has carried out periodic, unannounced "limited strikes" for several weeks to avoid signaling a return to major combat. A senior Iranian official told Reuters the two sides remain far from a deal and Iran would respond forcefully to further US action. Brent and WTI both rebounded modestly on 3 November after Monday's steep selloff. On 2 November, US officials told the Wall Street Journal that Iran's IRGC fired a surface-to-air missile at a US fighter jet near Qeshm Island, prompting the US aircraft to return fire in self-defense, and that US forces separately intercepted an IRGC missile launched from Qeshm Island that was targeting commercial shipping; ISW/CTP said it could not establish whether the launch was linked to earlier unconfirmed reports of US strikes near Jask (29 October) and Sirik (22 October). Iran's Revolutionary Guards Navy claimed on 3 November that three oil tankers struck naval mines and caught fire after disabling their AIS and using an unauthorized route south of the strait (IRGC claim, unverified, per ISW/CTP); Iranian media cited the IRGC a day later saying four tankers had been destroyed in the same area and two more vessels detained, a toll that does not match the prior day's claim. UKMTO reported that two unidentified projectiles struck a tanker's engine room on 3 November about 14 nautical miles northeast of Oman's Limah, with no casualties and no claim of responsibility. President Trump told Fox News the 3 November Qeshm Island strike hit an Iranian anti-aircraft facility, calling it a "minor attack" that "wasn't war," while Iranian state media reported Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had ordered the military to respond immediately to any threat. Mohsen Rezaei said on 3 November that the US reply to Iran's seven conditions for reopening the strait was "unconvincing" and that Washington must "fully and explicitly" address them before the strait reopens; Qatar's foreign ministry said both sides remain committed to the mediation process. Separately, Aramco CEO Amin Nasser told Reuters on 3 November the company is exploring additional export routes and overseas storage capacity, including a possible expansion of the 7 million b/d East-West Pipeline, and said more than 130 tanker attacks have been reported during the war with Gulf-to-Asia freight rates up more than 15-fold from a year earlier. UKMTO reported a tanker struck by two unidentified projectiles about 50 nautical miles north of Qatar's Madinat ash-Shamal at 23:20 GMT on 4 November; it did not identify the vessel or flag, no group claimed responsibility, and UKMTO said most ships now decline to report attacks at all. The New York Times reported on 4 November, citing unnamed Pentagon officials, that thousands of US air and naval forces are positioned to resume major combat operations against Iran on Trump's order; Iran's Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei said there should be "not the slightest inclination toward submission" to the US. Iran's Revolutionary Guards told Fars News on 5 November that a tanker hit a mine on an "illegal passageway" south of the strait and caught fire, and that a supertanker and the tugboat that approached to help also caught fire; Iran's army separately told IRNA that one tanker hit a mine early that day east of the strait and two more around midday, revising an earlier same-day count of three (IRGC and army claims, unverified; no independent confirmation). A senior Iranian official told Reuters that Tehran has sent a new nuclear-program proposal to Washington via Qatari mediators, and the New York Times separately reported Iran is reviewing mediators' proposals; Qatar's foreign ministry said both sides remain committed to the process. Brent fell almost 9% on 4 November after the midterm result, rebounded 3.9% to a $98.29 settlement on 5 November (Bloomberg, via Rigzone), and eased slightly to about $98.19 on 6 November (Trading Economics); Rapidan Energy Group's Bob McNally told CNBC on 6 November he sees an 80% probability that military fighting resumes, citing the unresolved dispute over Iran's nuclear program. President Trump said on 6 November the US carried out a new, separate strike on an Iranian air-defense system on Qeshm Island — distinct from the 2 November strike there — calling it "minor" and saying it knocked the system out in "about 15 minutes, maybe five"; Iranian state media reported two explosions in Qeshm's Suza area, and no casualties were reported. Iraq's Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein said on 8 November that Baghdad reached understandings with Washington to keep Iraqi crude moving through the strait via a shipping lane near Oman, putting Iraq's combined war and export losses at $60 billion; Reuters could not independently confirm the arrangement's terms. Separately on 8 November, Bloomberg reported that Trafigura, Vitol, Mercuria and ADNOC are seeking US Treasury licenses for about 50 of the roughly 1,600 US-sanctioned tankers, with no decisions finalized. Iran's Revolutionary Guards Navy said two tankers hit mines and caught fire on an "unauthorized route" on 7 November, and Fars News reported a third tanker also caught fire after an explosion (IRGC/Fars claims, unverified); separate blasts heard across southern Iran that evening, including on Qeshm Island, were not officially confirmed as missile strikes, and Iranian state television suggested they could be linked to Iran's own military activity rather than a US attack. UKMTO separately reported an incident involving a bulk carrier and military forces about 18 nautical miles east of Khor Fakkan, UAE — the same day and area as the US military's disabling of a cargo vessel on 7 November, though it's unclear if they're the same incident. Brent eased further to about $96.9/bbl and TTF to about €86.9/MWh on 9 November (Trading Economics).

Ship traffic

7-day average of daily tanker transits from IMF PortWatch (satellite AIS data, about a week's lag), through November 8, 2026.

Key figures

IEA estimates 3.5–5.5 mb/d of Saudi and UAE pipeline capacity could bypass Hormuz; the model counts the low end. Iran's Goreh–Jask line is effectively non-operational. Iraq's Basra, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain exports and all Qatari/UAE LNG (just over 112 bcm, almost 20% of global LNG trade) have no bypass. Most of the world's spare crude capacity (>4 mb/d, mainly Saudi) also sits behind the strait.

What if the Strait of Hormuz closes?

Closing it would cut about 19.9 mb/d of oil with no sea route around it. Usable pipeline bypass capacity of ~3.5 mb/d leaves a net shortfall of about 16.4 mb/d, roughly 15.8% of world oil demand.

Most exposed

• China: 4.6 mb/d of Hormuz crude in 2025, the largest single destination (IEA/Kpler).
• India: 2.1 mb/d of Hormuz crude; with Bangladesh and Pakistan, received almost two-thirds of its LNG via Hormuz.
• Japan & South Korea: Part of 6.2 mb/d of crude to 'other Asia'; IEA calls both particularly reliant on Hormuz flows.
• Bangladesh & Pakistan: Gas is 50% and 25% of their power mix; LNG shortfalls hit electricity supply directly.
• Europe: Only ~0.6 mb/d of crude and ~7% of its LNG came via Hormuz, but exposed through global prices.

Facilities cut off: Kharg Island, Ras Tanura Terminal, Mina al-Ahmadi, Ras Laffan LNG, Ras Tanura Refinery, Ruwais Refinery, Jubail Industrial Complex, Jebel Ali / Dubai, Burgan, Rumaila, West Qurna 1 & 2, Majnoon, Zakum (Upper & Lower), Safaniyah, Khafji (Partitioned Neutral Zone), North Field / South Pars, Dome (North Dome Extension), Ahvaz, Marun, Aghajari, Basra Oil Terminal (Al Basrah / Khor al-Amaya), Ras al-Ju'aymah crude/LPG terminal, Mina Abdullah refinery (Kuwait), Mesaieed Industrial City (Qatar).

Illustrative model using pre-crisis baselines; see how the what-if model works. Try combinations in the live map's What-if tab.

Recent developments

All events →

Background

Connects Persian Gulf to Gulf of Oman. ~21 km at narrowest. ~19.9 million bpd of oil in 2025, about a fifth of world demand (IEA, from Kpler tracking). Most critical energy chokepoint in the world. Bordered by Iran and Oman.

Geopolitical context

Iran's primary source of strategic leverage. Tehran has repeatedly threatened to close the strait during confrontations with the US (1988 tanker war, 2012 nuclear sanctions, 2019-2020 tensions). The US Fifth Fleet (based in Bahrain) maintains a permanent carrier presence specifically to guarantee freedom of navigation. In 2019, Iran seized tankers and attacked others with limpet mines, demonstrating capability without full closure. Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Iraq have invested billions in bypass pipelines (Petroline, Habshan-Fujairah) as insurance. A full closure would trigger a global energy crisis — oil prices could spike to $200+/bbl. The strait's narrow shipping lanes technically pass through Omani and Iranian territorial waters, making the legal framework complex.